


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
Never ask of money spent
Where the spender thinks it went
Nobody was ever meant
To remember or invent
What he did with every cent.

Robert Frost
The Hardship of Accounting



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A quarterly publication for the exchange among DDA personnel of ideas, concepts, information, and techniques that are of common interest.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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VOLUME 5, NO. 3

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comment

I'd like to use the next few pages to discuss the status of the CIA budget—the resources we all need to do our jobs. (U)

Our budget for this year (Fiscal Year 1980) has been increased; it is now considerably more appropriate to our needs than it was when the year began last October 1st. Our budget for next year, which is now midway on its path through Congress, should provide for an expanded CIA effort in 1981. The Executive Committee has approved our 1982 budget and sent it to the Director, where it will receive an Intelligence Community-wide review. 1982 holds out solid promise for substantial, needed growth. (S)

Those of you involved in the development of the 1982 program are to be congratulated for your professionalism and ingenuity. (U)

Maurice Lipton
Comptroller



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A quick look at the calendar will tell you that it is well over a year before we can start spending the 1982 budget, and that brings me to what I would like to be the central point of this article. The program we specify and the budget we devise to carry it out are probably the most important long-range planning mechanisms now in use in the Agency. With today's budgetary procedures and close scrutiny of CIA activities, we simply do not have the flexibility we once had to respond to the needs of the moment. The activities we are doing today are by and large those that were foreseen two years ago. If we now feel we were wrong in some aspect of our 1978 prediction about what we would have to do in 1980, then there's not too much we can do to fund different programs until 1982. (U)

We do have a Reserve for Contingencies that was established in 1952 to allow the Agency to deal promptly and securely with unforeseen circumstances. But Congress is now weighing the balance between their responsibility for oversight of funding

for Executive Branch programs and the Agency's need for flexibility under these circumstances. They are not likely to let us use the Reserve to make up for a lack of forethought. So there is a premium in the budget business on thoughtful and careful planning for the future. (S)

I will give you some more detailed thoughts about the future direction of Agency budgets, but first let me review where we've been. (U)

You are well aware of the pressures—economic, political, and perceptual—that have acted to constrain the Agency program for the past decade. Each budget for the past 10 years has given us less purchasing power than the year before. In the early 1970s, we were probably too big. It was likely that the whole government shared this condition. So we stopped doing some things that were no longer needed and our resources—funds and manpower—were correspondingly reduced. However, many of us have felt for some time that the year-by-year cuts in the real resources

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
of the CIA had left the fat far behind and that for the past few years it was muscle that was being cut. (S)

This period of declining manpower and funds has also been marked by increased demands in many areas. Threats to US interests are more extensive and more diffuse, and the analytic components of CIA are called on to cover in detail geographic areas and subjects which were of little intelligence concern in 1970. (C)

Collection has responded to the demands of analysis. The volume, timeliness, and quality of overhead imagery is many times better than it was a decade ago. Other technical collection systems have comparably expanded the amount of information flowing in. Exploiting this information—receiving it, processing it, and getting it to analysts in a form they can use—has been enormously expensive in personnel and money. (S)

Human source collection has also substantially increased the volume and quality of its reporting in the past several years. Now, in addition to calls for more effort on traditional targets, there are demands to expand coverage toward new areas of US interest—in the Third World, in terrorism, and in economic areas of little-recognized interest in 1970. On top of these intelligence tasks, we can add the extra jobs which we did not have 10 years ago: servicing Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests, supporting the various Congressional oversight functions, etc. (S)

How could we meet these demands with a steady decline in resources? We cut support, we reduced our covert action program, and we took some calculated risks in other areas. And we were anxious that in the competition for funds, that risk might have been too great. (S)



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██████████ and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—and the demands placed on the CIA as a result of them. There was just no way that we could respond to those demands for increased collection and analysis and the start of limited covert action programs with the operating budget we had. What little flexibility we had to shift resources was not enough. Fortunately, an Administration request to supplement our 1980 budget was approved by Congress, and we have been able to respond to the immediate needs. (S)

It is not a wild leap of speculation to assume, however, that the recent events in Southwest Asia are representative of, rather than exceptions to, the sorts of challenges which will confront American foreign policy in the years ahead. There is clearly a role for intelligence and covert action to play in support of that policy. (S)

It is not only analysis, collection, and covert action that must rise to these challenges. In my view, the whole support

structure of the Agency is dangerously thin in light even of today's demands. If I am right about future expansion of other CIA programs, then major expansion and modernization of general support activities will be required as well. (C)

The climate for a stronger CIA appears good. The Executive Branch looks increasingly to the Agency for support and recognizes that its demands for new areas of emphasis cannot be met simply by shifting resources. Congress has been generally sympathetic to increased budgets and has been actively supportive of our efforts to gain increased funds in 1980 and 1981 to cover unforeseen contingencies. And, no matter how painful the public revelations of CIA activities in the press for the past decade, the public has undeniably gained thereby a more sophisticated understanding of the needs for high quality national intelligence. My sense of the public mood is that it overwhelmingly favors a strengthened CIA. (C)

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All of this is not to say that I see the public vaults opening to supply us with whatever we request. That's not the way it's going to be. Our budgets will continue to be scrutinized and challenged by the Resource Management Staff, by the Office of Management and Budget, and by the appropriations and authorization committees of the House and Senate. Every dollar will enter our budgets only when those bodies are convinced that it is justified. (U)

And therein lies the challenge to all of us. In order to insure that we have the resources to meet the needs of the future, we are continually going to have to improve our internal planning and accountability. The key elements that I see in successful budgeting are:

- Reaching an Agency-wide consensus on our priorities
- Making sure that we are as willing to drop old programs that are no longer needed as we are to undertake new ones

- Matching the appropriate resources in each directorate to the task at hand. More and more, the issues CIA will tackle will cut across directorate lines
- Developing programs which are inherently flexible enough to adapt to a rapidly changing international intelligence climate
- Accurately calculating the resources which will be needed for a given task and projecting the resource implications for several years into the future
- Explaining the national benefits to be gained from each new program and each increment of resources (U)

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recruits

THE CAREER TRAINING PROGRAM (U)

OTR (U)

"It isn't what we don't know that gives us trouble, it's what we know that ain't so."

Will Rogers

The Career Training Program (CTP) continues to offer certain Agency employees a unique opportunity to prepare for a career as an Operations Officer in the Directorate of Operations (DDO). While the CTP does accept candidates for eventual assignment to other Agency components, the majority of Career Trainees have traditionally been new Agency employees embarking on careers in the DDO. The Career Training Staff (CTS), OTR, however, wishes to point out that the CTP is open to ALL Agency employees regardless of career service designation who meet certain basic selection standards. (U)

Program Officers on the CTS have discovered through interviewing internal candi-

dates that some confusion still exists over the selection criteria even though the Agency Vacancy Notice published as recently as January 1980 detailed these qualifications. So, to plug information gaps for the benefit of aspirants to the CTP and supervisors alike, we wish to draw attention to the following:

Minimum qualifications:

- Bachelor's degree with good academic record. Area of study is open, but a background in international relations, foreign affairs, physical sciences, or economics is desirable.
- Good oral and written communications skills.
- Strong career commitment to the Agency with the prospect of serving overseas approximately 70 percent of their career.
- Motivation to learn a foreign language and at least an average aptitude (tested).

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Desirable qualifications:

- Military (including paramilitary), overseas, and significant work experience. Demonstrated (tested) foreign language skill. (U)

Note: Candidates must either (1) be sponsored by their components (i.e., remain on the component's rolls with no change of service designation, or (2) if not sponsored, submit a written application to the CTS with concurrence of the employee's component. (U)

New Career Training classes are formed several times each year so interested employees are invited to apply at any time. Any questions, of course, may be directed to the CTS on [REDACTED] (U)

One final note: We recognize that many employees may not be cut out for work overseas as Operations Officers. Others,

on the other hand, may very well possess the requisite qualifications and interest in making a long-term commitment to such a rewarding career. To those employees: opportunity knocks! (U)

"Knowledge wisely applied is often considered 'Magic' by the unknowing."

R.C. Shafer

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PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT
INTERNSHIPS (U)

CMO-DDA (U)

As of July 1980, some 700 men and women with advanced degrees in Public Administration or a related field will have entered the Federal service. Seven of these Presidential Management Interns (PMIs) are or will be working with the Agency. (U)

President Carter envisaged the Presidential Management Intern Program as part of Civil Service Reform. He implemented it through Executive Order 12008 saying, "We can more directly tap the tremendous reservoir of innovation, education, experiment, advice and counsel that exists within our higher educational institutions that are not often used by government." (U)

The guiding hand for the Program is Alan K. Campbell, the former dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, and past president of the

National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, and now director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM). PMIs receive excepted appointments at the GS-09 level through a unique recruitment process:

- First, the candidates must be nominated by the dean of their graduate program, certifying academic excellence and narrative commentary.
- OPM reviews all nominations for eligibility.
- Those who are eligible (approximately 1,100 per year) face a rigorous session before a regional screening panel of state and local officials as well as Federal managers. The screening session includes a group exercise, a writing exercise, and a comprehensive individual interview. Nominees are evaluated against a standard of excellence in demonstrating leadership, communication skills, decision-making/problem solving, interpersonal

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dynamics, and potential for future professional growth.

- Finally, "superior" nominees receive a final review by a "blue ribbon" panel and OPM. (U)

As a result, 250 highly motivated, highly qualified Interns have entered the Federal service each summer since 1978. Women and minorities are an integral part of the PMI experience, making up approximately 50 and 18 percent respectively of each class. (U)

The next step is the Intern's selection of an agency and vice versa—quite an experience for the majority of Interns who choose to come to Washington rather than accept regional assignments. There are forty participating agencies (see chart). Contact may be initiated by the agency after reviewing Intern biographical sketches, or by the Intern after examining a profile of agency positions. The end result for the CIA was one hiree in 1978, two in 1979, and an anticipated four in this year's "class" (see roster). (U)

Agency PMIs are screened by OPPPM/SPD, which coordinates the Agency's participation in the Program. Selected Interns are then hired through CMO-DDA. Because of a flexible plan, we are exposed to Agency activity both within the DDA and other directorates. The first year consists of 4-month rotational assignments with three offices of the DDA and formal training through OTR. During the second year, the Intern may opt for two 6-month rotations outside the Directorate. These work experiences will aid the Intern in making a decision on a career track upon completion of the 2-year internship. As a result, the Intern who EOD'd in 1978 has chosen NFAC as a career assignment. (U)

The Intern receives government-wide exposure as well. Through bimonthly cluster group meetings, some 20 Interns from different agencies join together for candid discussions with high-level public managers, government officials, and civic leaders. These sessions are led by high-level career managers and resource leaders representing the academic or intergovernmental environ-

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ment. DD/A Don Wortman has been one of the excellent cluster group leaders for the "Class of '78" PMIs. (U)

The Bureau of Intergovernmental Personnel Programs administers the Program. This role includes access to noted speakers for special programs, PMI Conferences, and possible rotations with state and local governments for interested Interns. Finally, the Bureau is responsible for program evaluation: Intern feedback is facilitated through an annual retreat while Agency feedback is indicated through evaluation of Interns and continued participation. (U)

What is the PMI experience for the Intern? For me, it has been a stimulating opportunity to view the business of Intelligence in a broad perspective. It has been an experience marked by a variety of assignments on which to build a career working with dedicated, yet warm, people and yes, learning to do more with less. In its success the PMI Program will refine the Interns' managerial skills, provide the Agency with an additional resource of

skilled and innovative managers, and serve as a model to meet future recruitment needs throughout government. (U)

PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT INTERNS
WITH THE AGENCY (U)

1978

University of Wisconsin

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
1979

University of Delaware
Georgia College

1980

Brigham Young
American University
Brigham Young
Arizona State

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services

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SECURE
VOICE NETWORK (CISVN) (U)

OC (C)

To facilitate secure voice communications by Agency officers, OC provides and maintains an extensive secure telephone network. This network enables communication between officers in the various Agency buildings and permits calls to other government offices. It includes an interface to the Pentagon's worldwide AUTOSEVOCOM system, provides secure service to selected overseas posts through the use of the SKYLINK satellite system, and interconnects with a limited number of mobile secure voice terminals. The system is approved for the passage of material up to and including TOP SECRET, compartmented categories. Responsibility for verification of need-to-know and the proper clearance level of the receiving party is placed upon the person originating the call. (S)

The CISVN came into being with the installation of a mechanical telephone switch and several hundred instruments in the Headquarters Building in 1962. This installation was actually an extension of the NSA gray telephone system, and its use was limited to contacting other subscribers on that system. The gray switch is still in service, and has been expanded to include a total of 550 subscriber lines. It also interfaces with the other switches that now comprise the CISVN. (S)

Also in existence during this initial time period were several dedicated "point-to-point" links using a secure telephone device known as the KY-3. This equipment is still in wide use throughout the government, although it is gradually being replaced by newer systems. When first installed in the CISVN, these equipments provided for highquality secure service between selected individuals. In 1966, the Agency developed a modification for a standard Western Electric telephone switch that

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allowed it to be used in a network of KY-3s. The switch and the KY-3s became known as the CIA "green phone" system. This system is still in use, providing interconnecting service with systems in the White House, Pentagon and State Department. The green phone system also connects with the gray system on a restricted basis. The restrictions are necessary because not all subscribers in the green system hold the clearances required for access to the NSA system. (S)

X1A Throughout the seventies, the CISVN continued to grow, both in terms of the number of subscribers served and the extent of system usage. It did not, however, grow significantly in terms of quality of service until 1977. It had become apparent in the mid-seventies that with the growth in the number of Agency buildings [redacted] etc.), a centralized system approach was necessary to provide a more effective secure voice service. To implement such service, a central switch was activated in 1977. The central switch allows sub-

scribers to place calls to subscribers at any other building. (S)

Although the central switch represented a major upgrade of the system, its design addressed only the interconnect aspect of the network; overall system capacity was not increased. Since the time of the central switch design and procurement (1975-1976), the CISVN has grown well beyond its projected size, overloading the system and creating contention for circuits among the many users. This contention is evidenced by the "equipment or circuits busy" message many users receive, particularly during the peak business hours. With further expansion of Agency facilities planned and an increasing emphasis on the use of secure voice facilities, a network upgrade that addresses the entire system has become imperative. (S)

To increase the interconnect capabilities and provide secure voice service to the majority of officers in the Headquarters area, OC has initiated the Headquarters

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Secure Telephone System (HSTS) program. HSTS is a phased program (due to the magnitude of system cost), to be implemented in the 1980-1986 time frame. It will eventually provide a secure telephone instrument for each officer in the Headquarters Building, as well as the majority of those located in the satellite buildings. This expansion will increase the present service of approximately 1,700 lines serving 4,700 customers to over 10,000 lines available to 12,000 customers. The improvement in service will be particularly evident in buildings such as Ames and Key, which are currently served by only a handful of KY-3 instruments. (S)

HSTS equipment is based on commercially available telephone switching hardware, with relatively minor software additions to meet unique Agency requirements (e.g., after-hours disconnect). All of the hardware procured under this program will be computer-controlled, with few mechanical components. Much of the maintenance associated with the existing system will be

eliminated, and many new conveniences will be provided to the user. New user features will include call forwarding, user-initiated conferencing, an indication of call waiting, and other services usually associated only with commercial telephone service. (U)

The subscriber numbering plan for the new system will be a simplified version of the plan presently used. Subscribers will no longer be required to dial prefixes to reach other subscribers within the system. Subscribers at Headquarters and those buildings served by the new satellite switches will be able to contact any other Agency subscriber by dialing only the five-digit station number. Calls to external agencies will also be simplified; to place a call to the State Department, the subscriber will be required to dial only a four-digit number. (U)

The simplified operating procedures and special features to accompany HSTS will make the secure system more attractive

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to subscribers. Increased usage and an improved overall security posture for the Agency will result. (S)

Although this article has addressed only the domestic aspect of secure voice, OC does operate a network of overseas secure voice terminals. Interest in and usage of this capability has been limited, and planning

ODP CENTRALIZED LIBRARY SYSTEM (CLS) (U)

ODP (U)

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When an intelligence report is produced or a regulation is printed, there are well defined procedures for its circulation, control, storage, and disposition. What happens when the intelligence product is a computer program which traditionally ends up on a deck of cards, a computer tape, or other "machine readable media"? (U)

The management and protection of the Agency's data resources receive high priority and attention in ODP. Another facet of this concern is the standardization and protection of the user programs and software needed to access and manipulate this data. These programs are a unique and very valuable asset which represent many man-years of effort as well as many dollars in contractor effort. (U)

In the past, each programmer tended to look at a program as his private property,

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but when he transferred, his unlucky replacement was likely to find a deck of cards and a computer printout sitting on his desk. Quite often it was easier to rewrite a program than to try to decipher the original. This and related problems led Production Division (PD) to establish a Centralized Library System (CLS) in 1973. Before 1973, each programmer had his own system for storing and documenting programs. This usually consisted of various safes, file cabinets, bookcases, on-line disks, and tapes. (U)

Initially, PD was interested in the control and management of ODP-developed computer programs submitted for production processing. But with the installation of two automated systems, PANVALET and PANEXEC, it was possible to extend this service to all Agency users. PANVALET is used for source computer programs, as written by the programmer, and PANEXEC is used for com-

puter executable code, a load module program after conversion by a computer compiler. (U)

Once a program is included in the CLS, and the standard hardcopy documentation is stored in PD, many advantages accrue to the programmer and to the customer office. In addition to saving disk and other storage space, there is protection against loss or inadvertent destruction. These two systems automatically provide:

- Protection against accidental or unauthorized updates
- Individual program security control
- Historical versions of programs
- Instant program recall and display at a terminal
- Audit trail of updates
- Complete backup weekly and monthly (U)

ODP Technical Librarian, [REDACTED] locates documentation for a customer (U)

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Almost every office now uses the CLS to some extent. In addition, PANEXEC can also provide users with their own load module libraries which they can manage. (U)

As of this writing, the nearly 700 linear feet presently available for hardcopy documentation storage is almost filled. The automated system represents some 6,500 production source programs and 650 test source programs supporting 173 application projects. For detailed information, contact the Centralized Library on [REDACTED] (U)

KEEPING IN TOUCH—THE SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM (U)

[REDACTED] OS (C)

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As a consequence of the Moore, Boyce/ Lee, and Kampiles espionage cases, the CIA has reassessed many traditional ways of doing business. Security, for instance, has taken some new initiatives, and many of our longstanding programs were revitalized. One of our most effective and best received efforts is an expanded Security Education Program. The heart of this program is the Security Update Briefing designed to keep us in touch with the Agency population. (U)

In place of the traditional Agency-wide security indoctrinations of the past, the Security Education Group (SEG) has tried to tailor its security awareness sessions to the specific needs of an office, division, or staff. After a short security presentation, employees are given ample opportunity to ask questions about security policy,

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procedures, or practices. We've found that this format allows the SEG representatives to tailor their remarks to the audience and to explain the reasons behind some of the Agency's security practices. Supervisors and managers also attend and often get involved in the lively give and take which almost invariably occurs. (U)

The sessions have been very useful. Employees appreciate the chance to ask questions about security and not just be lectured about do's and don'ts. From Security's viewpoint, the concern and support expressed by employees is rewarding. It's encouraging to realize how many employees support an effective security program. Another plus is the growing realization by office managers and supervisors that much of what they believe to be the shortcomings of others is really their responsibility as unit security managers. Many supervisors come away with a refreshed and redirected sense of their security responsibilities. (U)

As expected, most of these sessions have been requested by office directors

or division chiefs. Others were held as a result of the initiative and invitation of individual office managers or a suggestion resulting from an office conference. (U)

An interesting aspect of these sessions has been the remarkable similarity in the security concerns expressed by people from a variety of offices. Take a look at some of these and see if they aren't some of your favorites, too.

- *I'm willing enough to use the secure telephone but what about the person from another office or government agency who calls me on the black line?*

We have found in our sessions that many people who handle classified material are unaware of the hostile intelligence threat from holding discussions on nonsecure telephones. It is each employee's responsibility to bring the problem (gently but nevertheless firmly) to the attention of people with whom

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they deal telephonically and ask that conversations be terminated and that they be resumed on appropriate secure lines.

- *I'm very careful with classified material so why can't I take it home?*

Our experience has been that regardless of how careful one is with classified material, there is a very real possibility that when material is removed from Agency buildings a variety of mishaps could result in inadvertent disclosure. We've actually learned the hard way that the practice is a poor one. Consequently, we've developed regulations that forbid such removal.

- *Morale in the Agency is low because of all the leaks in the Intelligence Community. When is the Agency going to prosecute people from other agencies who deliberately reveal classified material?*

The Agency would like to prosecute people who are found to be deliberately revealing classified material regardless of where they are employed. Unfortunately, the Department of Justice has been unable to devise a satisfactory method of pursuing prosecution which protects those parts of the material not revealed as well as the legal rights of the party accused. The Office of General Counsel is working closely with the Department of Justice to find an acceptable way to proceed against leakers.

- *Why doesn't the Office of Security do something about improving cover in the Agency?*

OS is not responsible for implementing cover in the Agency. However, OS is concerned about maintaining the cover of employees. We work closely with other offices to insure that their policies and practices do not inadvertently con-

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tribute to the cover problem of employees. Employees should also be aware that a breach of cover can become a matter of concern to Security.

- *What has the Agency done since the Kampiles case to provide better protection to SCI information?*

The Agency has taken a number of steps since Kampiles, some of which are designed to strengthen the awareness program in the Agency and to create a task force which is trying to get a handle on the classified information explosion in the Agency as well as devise a manageable and reasonable system of accounting. We've also taken some additional steps in protecting Agency buildings. (U)

Finally, we've received many good ideas from our Security Update sessions which have resulted in changes in office procedures. The significant thing about this

is that it comes from YOU, the employees and your managers, who see a problem and work to find an acceptable solution. Several offices, for example, have changed their telephone answering procedures as a result of Security's Updates. In One case, an entire directorate issued new instructions about answering telephones. (U)

OS believes that the 1980s are full of hope, excitement, and challenges for the Agency. An Agency population which is "on-side" and "in-touch" with Security is essential. That's the goal toward which SEG is working. Contact us—we'll work together. (U)

SECRET

information

IMMUNIZATIONS (U)

- Your gift to family
- Your community service
- Your protector

Plans and Support Staff, OMS (U)

American awareness and concern for the continued need for immunization protection from disease are on the decline. This situation constitutes an increased risk for all of us and our families. The incidence of measles, rubella, diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, and poliomyelitis is relatively low in this country. However, it will not remain so if we do not maintain our immunization protection. The increase in travel of the world population even furthers our risk. (U)

MEASLES (U)

Measles (rubeola) is often a severe disease, frequently complicated by middle ear infection or bronchopneumonia. Encephalitis

occurs in approximately one of every 1,000 cases; survivors often have permanent brain damage and mental retardation. Death, predominately from respiratory and neurologic causes, occurs in one of every 1,000 reported measles cases. (U)

Measles illness during pregnancy increases fetal risk. Most commonly, this involves premature labor and moderately increased rates of spontaneous abortion and of low birth weight. (U)

Before measles vaccine was available, more than 400,000 measles cases were reported annually in the United States. The introduction of vaccine in 1962 has resulted in a 90 percent reduction in the reported incidence of measles. With the highly effective, safe measles vaccine now available, the degree of measles control in the United States depends largely on the continuing effort to vaccinate all susceptible persons who can be safely vaccinated. (U)

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RUBELLA (German Measles) (U)

Rubella is a common childhood rash disease that is often overlooked or misdiagnosed. Signs and symptoms vary, and the most common features may not be recognized as rubella. Moreover, subclinical infection occurs frequently. (U)

Before rubella vaccine was available, most cases of rubella occurred in school-age children. Now, most cases are in adolescent and young adults. Since licensure of rubella vaccine in 1969, the incidence of reported rubella in adolescents and young adults has not decreased appreciably because vaccine was primarily used for preschoolers and elementary school children. Through 1977—more than 80 million doses of live attenuated rubella virus vaccine were distributed in the United States. Despite the considerable vaccination effort in young children, outbreaks of rubella continue to be reported in junior and senior high schools, colleges, the military, and places of employment. (U)

DIPHTHERIA (U)

Reported cases of diphtheria in the United States remain at 200-300 annually with some variation due to a few focal epidemics. Many of the reported cases are severe, and 10 percent of respiratory diphtheria cases are fatal. (U)

Although outbreaks of diphtheria in adults are becoming increasingly common in urban areas, most diphtheria cases occur in children. The majority of cases are unimmunized or inadequately immunized persons. (U)

TETANUS (U)

In 1975, 102 cases of tetanus were reported. All occurred in unimmunized persons, partially immunized persons, or persons whose immunization history was uncertain. More than half of the patients were 50 years of age or older. Since the tetanus organism is ubiquitous and there is no natural immunity to the tetanus toxin, immunization is a universal necessity regardless of age. Im-

SECRET

BASIC IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE (U)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Measles• Rubella• Diphtheria• Tetanus• Pertussis• Poliomyelitis | <p>A single dose of live measles vaccine is preferably given when children are about 15 months old; immunization is also recommended for susceptible adolescents and adults. (U)</p> <p>A single dose of vaccine is recommended for all children 12 months of age or older. Susceptible adolescent and adult females in the childbearing age group should also be immunized. (U)</p> <p>After receiving primary immunization, which is dependent upon the age of the recipient, that is, preschool, schoolchildren, or adult, booster immunization should be received preferably at the time of entrance to kindergarten or elementary school and thereafter and for all other persons every 10 years. (U)</p> <p>Primary immunization should be integrated with infants' DTP series including booster upon entering school. Routine primary polio vaccination of adults (those past the 18th birthday) residing in the United States usually is not necessary. Adults who are at increased risk of exposure should consult health care personnel. (U)</p> |
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Immune pregnant women provide maternal antibodies to their infants, thus protecting them against neonatal tetanus. (U)

Tetanus toxoid has proved to be a highly effective, long-lasting immunizing agent. Hypersensitivity reactions do occasionally occur in persons who have received an excessive number of booster injections. (U)

PERTUSSIS (Whooping Cough) (U)

The severe complications and high mortality from pertussis in infancy are the major reasons for immunization early in life. Pertussis is highly communicable—attack rates of up to 90 percent are reported for unimmunized household contacts. In 1972, a typical year, two-thirds of the reported pertussis deaths occurred in infants less than 1 year old. (U)

Cases and consequently deaths from pertussis have declined dramatically with increasing widespread use of standardized pertussis vaccine beginning in the late

1940s. Because the incidence, severity, and fatality of pertussis decrease with age, routine pertussis vaccination is not generally needed or recommended for persons 7 years of age or older. (U)

POLIOMYELITIS (U)

Poliovirus vaccines, used widely since 1955, have dramatically reduced the incidence of poliomyelitis in the United States. The annual number of reported cases of paralytic disease declined from more than 18,000 in 1954 to less than 20 in 1973-1978. The risk of poliomyelitis is generally very small in the United States today, but epidemics are certain to occur if the immunity of the population is not maintained by immunizing children beginning in the first year of life. (U)

The proportion of the U.S. population fully immunized against poliomyelitis appears to have declined in recent years. The United States Immunization Survey in 1978 indicated that only 60 percent of 1 to 4-year-

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old children had completed primary vaccination against poliomyelitis. Rates for infants and young children in disadvantaged urban and rural areas were even lower. (U)

Do yourself a favor: give your spouse and children a gift and perform a community service through the simple act of maintaining immunization protections for your family. It will go a long way toward providing everyone with a healthy and fruitful life. (U)

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE AGENCY (U)

OF (U)

Why is a financial system necessary? Many view financial administration as a necessary evil. For most managers, particularly operational or technical personnel, financial matters are best left to the "green eyeshade" people who thrive on poring over columns of figures and computer print-outs. In actuality, financial administration is an integral part of management. (U)

A financial system consists of the following elements: planning and budgeting, budget execution, and accounting. (U)

PLANNING AND BUDGETING (U)

The planning function consists of the formulation of resource requirements necessary for an organization to meet its objectives. The budgeting process quantifies these requirements. It attaches numbers

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to the personnel and dollar requirements and thus defines the resource requirements in a numerical framework.

BUDGET EXECUTION (U)

Once the requested resources have been appropriated, the requesting component must monitor usage to ensure maximum efficiency, not to mention exercising caution to avoid overspending. (U)

The mechanism by which this occurs is the obligating or commitment of government funds against the component allotment. Obligations eventually become expenses, but for this process to transpire, another process called accounting must occur. (U)

ACCOUNTING (U)

Government employees are viewed as stewards of the monies entrusted to them.

As good stewards it is therefore necessary to render an accounting of how these monies were used or spent. As one source put it, "Accountability is accomplished by a system of internal checks based upon recordkeeping." (U)

Our source goes on to divide accounting into two types. The first type of accounting deals with custodianship, the accounting for money spent, material consumed, etc. The second type deals with the effectiveness or benefit received from resources used. In private industry it is called return on investment (ROI). As our source put it, "This kind of accountability asks whether fiscal officers are good managers." (U)

In addition to the aforementioned, the financial system must also aid in the process of decisionmaking. It must respond to managers' needs for information as they ensure that resources not needed in one area may be more effectively employed elsewhere. (U)

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BUDGETING (U)

The Agency has three budgets—the program plan, the OMB budget, and the Congressional budget.

The program plan is just that, a planning document. It is the medium by which the various components express what they feel are their resource requirements. This is a multi-year program: it includes the current year (as a base), the budget year, the program year, and four succeeding years. This document is reviewed by the Deputy Director and establishes the guidelines for the next budget submission. (U)

The next submission is known as the OMB budget or is sometimes referred to as the office estimates. It is formulated following the guidelines established by the program submission. This budget goes to the OMB where it is reviewed in respect to Presidential guidelines and priorities. The OMB holds hearings with Agency operating officials regarding their budget re-

quests. Finally, the OMB establishes guidelines for the Agency budget. (U)

The third and final submission is the Congressional budget. In this exercise the estimates are refined within OMB guidelines. This document ends up in Congress where the amounts requested may or may not be appropriated. Finally, the requested or adjusted budget is appropriated by Congress. (U)

In the CIA's case, this appropriation does not come directly to the Agency but instead comes through the OMB, which gives the Agency an apportionment. This represents the amount that can be obligated by the Agency. The amount of the apportionment may not be the same as the amount of the appropriation. OMB through this apportionment can direct the Agency as to the nature of obligations as they relate to activities, projects, or object classes. (U)

The Agency Comptroller allots the apportionment to the various directorates.

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These allotments allow the directorates to obligate and expend from the Agency's apportionment. (U)

The directorates in turn suballot to the various offices and components within their jurisdiction. These suballotments become the operating budgets for these components. (U)

The various components obligate against their operating budgets. An obligation is a valid and binding commitment to spend government money for purposes such as travel, payroll, contracts, etc., and reserves the funds for that purpose. (U)

When the purpose for which funds are obligated is met, i.e., travel completed, terms of contract satisfied, etc., an expense occurs. The expense then liquidates the obligation. For example, an obligation is established for \$500 for a travel order. The traveler completes the travel and submits an accounting for \$400. The accounting

then becomes an expense and replaces the obligation. (U)

Expenses require the review and certification of a finance officer. All certifications are made in compliance with legal guidelines. One of the functions of the GAO is to audit the financial transactions of various government agencies to ensure they fall within the purview of legality. The CIA, because of its sensitive nature, is exempted from GAO audit. However, to ensure that Agency operations are conducted within the legal framework, we have our own internal audit staff. (U)

It is their role to not only ascertain the legality of transactions but also to determine if activities are indeed cost effective. They have only recently entered the area of benefit analysis, but it is certainly in keeping with the second type of accounting mentioned earlier in this paper. (U)

To accomplish the task of budget formulation and execution, the Agency also

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has a high degree of automation in its Agency Financial System. (U)

In summary, we have purported to relate here the role of financial administration to the government at large and how it is generally exercised in the Agency. (U)

The Financial System stands to serve the Manager in performing his task in controlling the resources necessary to perform his Agency function. (U)

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note

Within the next several issues, you will notice some changes in *Exchange*. We recently received approval to try some new ideas. Among them are:

— *Theme issues*. If you have any theme ideas, we'll take them. We tried a small version of the theme this time by having several articles, pictures, and quotations on MONEY.

— *Anonymous articles*. Send them to your office senior editor. Names are listed at the front of *Exchange*.

— *First person articles*. Has anything interesting happened in your job lately? It might be a candidate for an article. Not to let the rest of you off the hook—if something interesting hasn't happened, "business as usual," you still might have an article.

— *Current Events*. Offices will contribute a small paragraph about some new development. Give your ideas to our editors.

— *Authors from other directorates*. If you have a suggestion or if there is a particular non-DDA function which you would like to hear about, let us know. We have some plans to request articles from NFAC, DDS&T, and DDO, but we could always use more ideas.

— *Short articles*. A common misconception is that articles for *Exchange* have to be lengthy. If three or four sentences adequately say what you would like to say, we'll take it.


Final word—there is now quite a growing number of authors who have been published in *Exchange*. Why aren't you one of them?

"Being an editor is a hard job, but a fascinating one. There's nothing so hard as minding your own business, and an editor never has to do that."

Finley Peter Dunne

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Directorate of Administration

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